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ARTICLES
BUSH v. GORE WAS NOT JUSTICIABLE
Erwin Chemnennsky*
INTRODUCTION
On December 12, 2000, for the first time in American history, the
Supreme Court decided who would be the next President of the
United States. In Bush v. Gore,' the Supreme Court concluded that it
violated equal protection to count the uncounted votes in Florida
without dear, uniform standards.2 The Court said that the case could
not be remanded to the Florida courts, because Florida law required
that the counting be completed by December 12, 2000 to meet the
"safe harbor provision" created by federal law.
3
Bush v. Gore was a 5-4 decision, with the Justices split entirely
along ideological lines.4 The per curiam opinion wasjoined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas; the dissenters were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.5 A large segment of the American people-certainly the ma-
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law., Legal Ethics, and Political
Science, University of Southern California.
1 121 S. Ct 525 (2000).
2 See id. at 529, 532-33.
3 See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994); Bush, 121 S. Ct at 533.
4 In the aftermath of Bush v. Gore, some commentators suggested that it reall.
was a 7-2 decision. See Michael W. McConnell, A AMfuddled Ruling; W'A.. Sr.J., Dec.
14, 2000, at A26. It was not. Two of the dissentingJustices, Breyer and Soiter, agreed
that there were equal protection problems with counting votes without uniform stan-
dards. SeeBush, 121 S. Ct. at 545 (SouterJ., dissenting); id. at 551 (BreyerJ., dissent-
ing). However, their opinions were expressly labeled as dissents. They could have
"concurred in part and dissented in part," but did not. Moreover, the key difference
between the majority and the dissents was whether die counting should be halted or
continued. The five Justices in the majority voted to end the counting; the four dis-
sentingJustices would have allowed it to continue. The case as clearly and obviously
a 5-4 ruling.
5 Also, a concurring opinion was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist that as
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. It argued that counting the votes in Florida
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jority of citizens who voted for Al Gore-regard the ruling as a parti-
san decision where five conservative Republican Justices handed the
election to the Republican candidate, George W. Bush.
Bush v. Gore obviously attracted enormous public and media at-
tention. Yet, one crucial aspect of the case was largely overlooked:
justiciability. For all of the discussion about the decision, no one
seemed to pay much attention to whether the Court properly had the
legal authority to hear the case. Most likely, this is because jus-
ticiability doctrines are complicated and unfamiliar to the public. Per-
haps, too, this is because neither of the parties raised justiciability
issues in their briefs. This, however, does not excuse the Court's fail-
ure to raise it, because it is firmly established that justiciability issues
are jurisdictional, and courts are to raise them even if the parties do
not.
6
In this Article, I argue that Bush v. Gore was not justiciable and
that the Supreme Court should have dismissed the case on these
grounds. Part I argues that George W. Bush lacked standing to raise
the claims of Florida voters that they were denied equal protection by
the counting of votes without standards. Bush's argument was based
entirely on discrimination among voters in Florida as a result of the
counting of ballots without standards. But he personally did not sutf-
fer this injury, and he did not have standing to raise the rights of the
Florida voters.
Part H1 contends that the case was not ripe for review, because the
counting had not yet occurred. Quite possibly, the Florida trial judge
overseeing the counting might have eliminated disparities. Also, it is
possible that Bush would have been ahead at the end of all of the
counting. Phrased another way, Bush's claim was an "as applied" chal-
lenge, not a facial challenge to Florida law. Yet, the Supreme Court
decided the case before the Florida law was applied and thus before
the case was ripe.
Part III argues that the case was a political question. The Court
should have left the dispute to be resolved by Congress. In another
voting context, the Supreme Court spoke expressly of "the large pub-
lic interest in allowing the political processes to function free from
judicial supervision .... ,,7
under the Florida Supreme Court's decision was an impermissible change in the law
in violation of 3 U.S.C. § 5. Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 533 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
6 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975).
7 O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 5 (1972); see infta text accompanying notes
92-101.
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Part IV contends that at the very least, the Court should have let
Florida courts decide whether Florida law prevented the counting
from continuing. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ended the counting
entirely based on its conclusion that Florida law required the comple-
tion of the process by December 12. Yet, no Florida statute says this
and the Florida Supreme Court never had decided whether, faced
with the December 12 deadline, Florida law required that the count-
ing continue or cease. It should have been for the Florida Supreme
Court to interpret Florida law. This is a further reason why the case
should have been dismissed as nonjusticiable.
In his dissent, Justice Breyer refers to the case as a "self-inflicted
wound,"8 the phrase used to describe the Court's infamous ruling in
Dred Scott v. Sandford.9 Justice Breyer concluded his dissent by stating:
I fear that in order to bring this agonizingly long election pro-
cess to a definitive conclusion, we have not adequately attended to
that necessary "check upon our own exercise of power," "our own
sense of self-restraint." Justice Brandeis once said of the Court,
"The most important thing we do is not doing." What it does today,
the Court should have left undone)
0
This Article argues that Justice Breyer was right.
I. STANDING
Procedurally, Bush v. Gore came to the Supreme Court on a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari brought by George W. Bush seeking review
of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. After Florida Secretary of
State Katherine Harris certified George W. Bush as the victor in Flor-
ida on Sunday, November 26, Al Gore filed a contest under Florida
law." A Florida trial courtjudge in Leon County, Florida held a hear-
ing and concluded on December 4, 2000 in favor of Bush.Y2 The
judge ruled that Gore needed to prove a probability that he would
prevail .if a recount were held and that Gore failed to prove this.' 3
The Florida Supreme Court immediately granted review, held a
hearing on December 7, and on December 8 reversed the Florida trial
court's decision not to conduct a recount. 4 The Florida Supreme
8 Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); see CIAR.LEs Ev.u.'s Huotis, TilE St:PRLaE
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATION, MNETHODS AND AcIE%.E.F%,rs, AN IN.
TERPRETATION 50 (1928).
10 Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 557-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
11 See FtA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West 1982); Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 528.
12 See Bush 121 S. Ct. at 528.
13 See id.
14 See id. at 527-29.
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Court ruled that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. l 5
Florida law states that a candidate can contest an election by demon-
strating "[r] eceipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a num-
ber of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of
the election." 16 The Florida Supreme Court ruled that Gore met this
burden; the closeness of the election and the existence of many bal-
lots that the machines did not count were sufficient to "place the re-
sults of this election in doubt."17 The Florida Supreme Court ordered
the counting to begin immediately across the state.'8 Pursuant to this
order, the counting began first thing the next morning, Saturday, and
the trial judge expected that the counting could be completed by 2:00
p.m. on the next day, Sunday.19
Bush immediately sought Supreme Court review of the Florida
Supreme Court's decision. On Saturday afternoon, December 9, the
Supreme Court stayed the counting in Florida, granted review, and
scheduled oral arguments for Monday, December 11.21 In other
words, the case came to the Supreme Court on a petition for a writ of
15 See id.
16 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3) (c) (West 1982 & Supp. 2001).
17 Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 528.
18 See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000).
19 Dan Balz, Fa. Supreme Court Orders Partial Recount Across State, Bush Appeals to
U.S. High Court as Ruling Cuts Lead to 154 Votes, WAsH. PosT, Dec. 9, 2000, at Al, A15.
20 See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512, 512 (2000). Apart from thejusticiability issues
discussed in this Article, the Supreme Court's grant of a stay was wrong. The Court
can stay a lower court ruling only if there is an irreparable injury that will occur with-
out a stay. But there was no irreparable injury to allowing the counting to continue
pending the Supreme Court's hearing and deciding the case. Justice Scalia wrote an
opinion arguing that there was irreparable injury justifying the stay. See id. at 512.
Scalia gave two reasons.
First, allowing the counting to continue could undermine the "legitimacy" of the
Bush presidency if the count showed Gore the winner and the Supreme Court disal
lowed the count. See id. But this is speculative; it could not be known whether the
count would put Bush or Gore on top, and it could not be known how the American
public would react if Gore was ahead and the Court disallowed the counting. Moreo-
ver, the Court's stopping the counting also undermined the legitimacy of the Bush
presidency. If legitimacy is an appropriate judicial concern, then the Court's prevent-
ing the votes from being counted hurt both the legitimacy of the presidency and of
the Court. But all of this assumes that the Court should be concerned with the pub.
lic's perception of the election and that any adverse perceptions constitute irrepara
ble injury.
Second, Justice Scalia said that handling the ballots causes their degradation and
could prevent a more accurate recount later. See id. However, there was no evidence
in the record to support this claim. Also, the argument is disingenuous; the Court
stopped the counting to preserve a later count that never could occur. In Bush v,
Gore, the Court said that Florida law set a December 12 deadline for counting. The
io96 [VOL, 76:4
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certiorari by the defendant in the lawsuit, George W. Bush. Bush's
central claim was that counting of ballots without uniform standards
violated equal protection.
2 1
But did Bush have standing to raise this claim? The Supreme
Court long has said that the requirement for standing is based on Arti-
cle Ill's limiting the federal courts to deciding "cases" and "controver-
sies."22 Standing is thus jurisdictional, and courts must raise it on
their own even if it is not challenged by the parties. Standing is the
determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to
bring a matter to the court for adjudication. The Supreme Court has
declared that "[i]n essence the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or
of particular issues."
23
In no way was Bush treated any differently from Gore during the
counting process. There was no reason to believe that the counting
procedure would treat ballots for Bush any differently from ballots for
Gore. Nor did Bush contend that he was treated unequally in the
counting process. In other words, Bush was not claiming that he was
being discriminated against in the counting of the uncounted votes.
The equal protection issue was not discrimination between Bush and
Gore, but rather discrimination among ballots. The only equal pro-
tection claim was that a voter's ballot might be disallowed while an
identical ballot would be counted. This claim made it irrelevant
whether both ballots were for the same candidate or if they were for
different candidates; the argument was that to treat two similar ballots
differently denied equal protection to the voter whose ballot was
disallowed.
The Supreme Court has declared that the "irreducible minimum"
of Article III's limit on judicial power is a requirement that a party
"show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury
..... George W. Bush did not and could not claim that he was
denied equal protection. The Florida Supreme Court did not discrim-
Supreme Court knew, on December 9, that stopping the count effectively decided the
election.
There was no irreparable injury to allowing the counting to continue. But Al
Gore obviously suffered irreversible injury by halting the counting.
21 See Brief for Petitioners at 18, 40-45, Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (No.
00-949).
22 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldon, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
23 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
24 Valley Forge Christian Coil. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bell 'ood, 441
U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
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inate against him in any way or treat him differently from Al Gore.
Bush did not have standing to raise an equal protection claim, be-
cause he did not "personally suffer" any discrimination.
The Supreme Court has expressly applied standing in the elec-
tion context. In United States v. Hays,25 the Court held that only a
person residing within an election district may argue that the lines for
the district were unconstitutionally drawn in violation of equal protec-
tion.26 The Supreme Court has held that the government may use
race in drawing election district lines only if it meets strict scrutiny,
even if the purpose is to increase the likelihood of electing minority-
race representatives. 27 In Hays, the Court held that only individuals
residing within a district suffer an injury from how the lines for that
district are drawn. The Court said that a "plaintiff [who] resides in a
racially gerrymandered district ... has standing to challenge the legis-
lature's action,"28 but a plaintiff who resides outside the district fails to
suffer "the injury our standing doctrine requires."
2 9
Bush v. Gore is directly analogous. In Hays, the Court said that a
plaintiff who resided outside the voting district could not raise the
claims of other voters who resided within the district; yet, that is ex-
actly what George W. Bush did. As in Hays, there was not standing in
Bush v. Gore.
Several arguments might be made in support of Bush having
standing to raise the equal protection issue. First, Bush could claim
that he was injured by the counting of the ballots; they could lead to
his losing in Florida and thus the presidential election. As discussed
in Part III, there is a serious problem with this argument from a ripe-
ness perspective; the counting had not yet occurred, so it was specula-
tive as to whether this injury would occur. Also, Bush's injury of not
winning the presidency was distinct from the injury to the voters in
having their ballots counted unequally. Because Bush did not vote in
Florida he could not present this injury. Plaintiffs only have standing
25 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
26 Id. at 745. The Court reaffirmed and applied this limitation on standing to
challenge election districts in Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1996), and Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 957-58 (1996) (plurality opinion).
27 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S,
630, 644 (1993).
28 Hays, 515 U.S. at 744-45.
29 Id. at 747. Although the Court expressly said that the injury requirement was
not met, the Court also said that the case presented a "generalized grievance." Id. at
745. This raises the question of whether the Court continues to believe that the gen-
eralized grievance requirement is a separate standing rule or simply another way of
saying that there is not an injury sufficient for standing purposes.
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to present the injuries that they personally suffer.30 As the Supreme
Court declared, "[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged injury suffi-
cient to meet the 'case or controversy' requirement, this Court has
held that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or in-
terests of third parties."31
Again, an analogy can be drawn to Hays, where the Court held
that only voters within a district can challenge how its election districts
are drawn. A voter residing in a contiguous district, who claims to
have been excluded because of the race-based districting, could claim
to be injured.3 2 Drawing lines for one election district inevitably af-
fects the lines for neighboring districts. But the Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected this argument and said that voters in one district, even
though they were affected, could not raise the claims of other voters.33
By analogy, Bush's injury in perhaps losing the presidency did not ac-
cord him standing to raise the claims of Florida voters whose ballots
were claimed to be counted unequally.
Second, it can be argued that Bush had third-party standing to
raise the rights of Florida voters. This is the strongest claim for stand-
ing in Bush v. Gore. Generally, third-party standing is not allowed;
plaintiffs only have standing to raise their own claims and cannot pre-
sent the injuries suffered by third parties not before the Court.3 "
There are, however, exceptions where third-party standing is
permitted.
For example, a person may assert the rights of a third party not
before the court if there are substantial obstacles to the third party
asserting his or her own rights, and if there is reason to believe that
the advocate will effectively represent the interests of the third party.35
Barrows v. Jackson3 6 is the most famous example of this and the case
30 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
31 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also United Food and Commer-
cial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, 517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996) (discussing
the bar against third-party standing as prudential).
32 But see Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights
Trilog, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 245 (arguing that even voters who live in majority-minority
districts should not have standing).
33 Hays, 515 U.S. at 747; see supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
34 See Henry P. Monaghan, Third Part, Standing, 84 COLUM. L RE'. 277, 278 n.6
(1984) (definingjus tertii standing); see also Robert Allen Sedler, The Assertion of Con-
stitutionaljus Tertii: A Substantive Approad, 70 Gu.. L. RE%'. 1308, 1315-19 (1982) (argu-
ing that the Court is wrong to consider constitutional jus tertii in terms of standing).
35 See Sec'y of State v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984).
36 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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most closely analogous to Bush v. Gore. In Barrows, the Court allowed
third-party standing and permitted an individual sued for breaching a
racially restrictive covenant to assert the rights of blacks in the com-
munity.37 Barrows, a white person who had signed a racially restrictive
covenant, was sued for breach of contract for allowing nonwhites to
occupy the property.38 The defense was based on the rights of blacks,
who were not parties to the lawsuit, for breach of contract.30 The
Court allowed third-party standing, permitting the white defendant to
raise the interests of blacks to rent and own property in the commu-
nity.40 The Court stated that "it would be difficult if not impossible
for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance
before any court."41 Because blacks were not parties to the covenant,
they had no legal basis for participating in the breach of contract suit.
Bush, like the party raising the discrimination claim in Barrows,
was the defendant raising the claims of third parties. Bush can argue
that, like in Barrows, the injured third parties were not part of the
litigation. But there the analogy stops. The key difference is that in
Barrows the victims of discrimination likely had no basis for their own
lawsuit. Barrows was litigated in the early 1950s, before open housing
laws were enacted. In Bush, there is no reason why Florida voters
could not bring their own claim, either in a separate action or by in-
tervening in the on-going litigation. This exception to the prohibition
of third-party standing requires that the injured third party be un-
likely to protect its own rights, and that was not present here.
In response to this, it could be argued that no Florida voter could
know if it is his or her ballot that is going uncounted; thus no Florida
voter can meet the requirements for standing. But the Supreme
Court long has said that the absence of a plaintiff for standing indi-
cates that the matter is left to the political process and not to the
courts. In United States v. Richardson,42 the plaintiff claimed that the
statutes providing for the secrecy of the Central Intelligence Agency
budget violated the Constitution's requirement for a regular state-
ment and accounting of all expenditures. 43 The Court ruled that the
plaintiff lacked standing because his case presented a generalized
grievance;44 the plaintiff did not allege a violation of a personal consti-
37 See id. at 257.
38 See id. at 254-55.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 257.
41 Id.
42 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
43 See id. at 167-69.
44 See id. at 170.
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tutional right, but instead claimed injury only as a citizen and tax-
payer.4 The Court deemed irrelevant the plaintiff's claim that if he
could not sue, no one could. The Court stated:
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate
this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any
particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to
the argument that the subject matter is committed to tie surveil-
lance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.
46
A second exception to the ban against third-party standing per-
mits an individual to assert the rights of third parties where there is a
close relationship between the advocate and the third party. For ex-
ample, doctors often have been accorded standing to raise the rights
of their patients in challenging laws limiting the patients' access to
contraceptives and abortions. In Singleton v. 11uff,4 two physicians
were accorded standing to challenge a state statute that prohibited the
use of state Medicaid benefits to pay for nontherapeutic abortions
(abortions that were not necessary to protect the health or life of the
mother) .as
It is difficult to fit Bush v. Gore within this exception. There is no
personal relationship between Bush and the Florida voters. The
Court has used this exception only in the circumstances in which
there is both such a relationship and an interrelationship of the rights
involved. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,49 a parochial school was accorded
standing to challenge an Oregon law requiring all children to attend
public school.50 In Craig v. Boren,," the Court allowed bartenders to
raise the claims of their customers in challenging an Oklahoma law
that allowed women, but not men, to buy 3.2% beer at age eighteen..
5
12
These cases all involve a very different kind of relationship than that
in Bush v. Gore.
At the very least, the Supreme Court should have addressed
standing and explained why it accorded Bush standing to raise the
claims of Florida voters. For decades, the Supreme Court has stressed
the importance of standing as a constitutional requirement. The Su-
45 Id. at 169, 175.
46 Id. at 179.
47 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
48 See id. at 118. But see Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (denying
standing to doctor to raise challenges to law prohibiting use of contraceptives on
behalf of patients).
49 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
50 See id. at 535-36.
51 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
52 See id. at 192-94.
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preme Court has said that standing "is founded in concern about the
proper-and properly limited role-of the courts in a democratic so-
ciety."53 In Bush v. Gore, the Court ignored these limits.
II. RIPENESS
The ripeness doctrine seeks to separate matters that are prema-
ture for review, because the injury is speculative and never may occur,
from those cases that are appropriate for federal court action.5 4 Ripe-
ness, like standing, is based on Article III's requirement for cases and
controversies.55 Even if it is accepted that George W. Bush had stand-
ing to raise the claims of Florida voters, there is a distinct issue as to
whether this claim was ripe for review.
For several reasons, the issues before the Supreme Court in Bush
v. Gore were not ripe for review. The central issue was whether the
counting of votes would deny equal protection. A constitutional viola-
tion would arise only if similar ballots were treated differently in the
counting process; but it could not be known if this would happen un-
til all votes were counted and the trial judge in Florida, Judge Lewis,
ruled on all of the challenges. Until then, it was purely speculative as
to whether there would be a problem with similar ballots being
treated differently.
The Supreme Court, in its per curiam opinion, focused on ine-
qualities that already had occurred. The opinion points to differences
in the Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counting.5 6 However, the count-
ing that already had been done was not the issue before the Supreme
Court.57 The only issue was whether the counting should continue.58
The prior experience was not predictive of what was to occur because
53 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
54 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
55 See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974) (dismissing as not ripe a
suit contending that the defendants, a magistrate and a judge, discriminated against
blacks in setting bail and imposing sentences).
56 See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 527 (2000).
57 At one point, the per curiam opinion argues that the past inequalities were
relevant. The Court stated: "That brings the analysis to yet a further equal protection
problem. The votes certified by the court included a partial total from one county,
Miami-Dade. The Florida Supreme Court's decision thus gives no assurance that the
recounts included in a final certification must be complete." Id. at 531-32. But even
the Supreme Court's phrasing acknowledges that it was speculative as to whether
there would be incompleteness by the time the counting was finished. The existence
and extent of this incompleteness could not be known when the Supreme Court de-
cided the case on December 12, precisely because the Court had stayed the counting
process.
58 See id. at 532-33.
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of a key change: a single judge was overseeing the counting under the
Florida Supreme Court's decision.59 This judge was to hear all of the
disputes and potentially could eliminate any inequalities by appl)ing a
uniform standard.
60
Justice Stevens emphasized exactly this point in his dissent. He
wrote: "Admittedly, the use of differing substandards for determining
voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems
may raise serious concerns. Those concerns are alleviated-if not
eliminated-by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ulti-
mately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process."6 '
Justice Stevens, however, did not draw a key conclusion from his
observation: the challenge to the counting was not ripe for review.
Only after the counting was completed could the parties claim that
there was inequality and thus a constitutional violation.
Phrased another way, the Supreme Court improperly treated an
"as applied" equal protection challenge as if it were a facial challenge.
Bush was not arguing that the Florida election law was unconstitu-
tional on its face. Neither in the briefs nor in the oral argument did
Bush's lawyers suggest such a facial attack. Rather, Bush's argument
was that counting without uniform standards denied equal protection.
This is an equal protection violation only if, after the counting and the
resolution of disputes by the judge, similar ballots are treated differ-
ently. But that cannot possibly be known until the ballots are all
counted. Until then, it was purely speculative as to whether there
would be a denial of equal protection.
The ripeness doctrine is intended to prevent federal courts from
deciding such speculative claims.6 2 The Court has applied the ripe-
ness doctrine in the voting context. For example, in Texas v. United
States,63 the Supreme Court refused to rule as to whether the
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 applied to the
possible appointment of a magistrate to oversee school districts that
failed to meet performance standards." The Court noted that no
magistrate had yet been appointed and that the appointment of a
magistrate was a last resort to be used only if all other means failed.33
The Court concluded that the case was not ripe, because it was too
59 See id. at 532.
60 Seeid.
61 Id. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 SeeAbbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
63 523 U.S. 296 (1998).
64 See i at 302.
65 See id. at 300.
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speculative whether a magistrate ever would be appointed 66 Likewise,
it was completely speculative as to the nature and extent of inequali-
ties that would exist in the counting that was occurring under Judge
Lewis's oversight.
67
Bush v. Gore was not ripe for an even more basic reason: George
W. Bush might well have ended up ahead after the counting. In that
event, there obviously would have been no need for the Supreme
Court to decide his appeal. The Supreme Court repeatedly has held
that a case is not ripe when it is unknown whether the injury will be
suffered. For example, in Reno v. Catholic Social Services,68 the Su-
preme Court held that a challenge to Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) regulations had to be dismissed on ripeness grounds,
because it was too speculative that anyone would be injured by the
rules. 69 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198670 provided
that before illegal aliens residing in the United States could apply for
legalization, they had to apply for temporary resident status. 7' Tem-
porary resident status required a showing that a person continually
resided in the United States since January 1, 1982, and a continuous
physical presence since November 6, 1986.72 The INS adopted many
regulations to implement this law.
73
A class of plaintiffs, Catholic Social Services, challenged some of
the INS regulations. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Souter, held that the case was not ripe for review.7" The Court said
that it was entirely speculative whether any members of the class
would be denied legalization because of the regulations. 75 The Court
said that the case might be ripe for review if the immigrants took the
additional step of applying for legalization.
76
Bush v. Gore was not ripe for review on December 9, when the stay
was issued, or December 11, when the case was heard, or December
12, when it was decided. The case would have been ripe only after all
the counting was done if (a) Gore came out ahead in Florida and (b)
Bush could present evidence of inequalities in how the ballots were
66 See id. at 302.
67 See id.
68 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
69 See id. at 66-67.
70 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
71 See Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. at 46.
72 See id.
73 See id.
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actually counted. Until and unless these eventualities occurred, the
case was not ripe and should have been dismissed.
IL. POLmCAL QUESTION Doarmw,
Yet another distinctjusticiability requirement is the political ques-
tion doctrine. The political question doctrine refers to allegations of
constitutional violations that the federal courts will not adjudicate.
The Supreme Court has held that certain allegations of unconsti-
tutional government conduct should not be ruled on by the federal
courts even though all of the jurisdictional and other justiciability re-
quirements are met. The Court has said that constitutional interpre-
tation in these areas should be left to the politically accountable
branches of government, the President and Congress. In other words,
the "political question doctrine" refers to subject matter that the
Court deems to be inappropriate for judicial review. Although there
is an allegation that the Constitution has been violated, the federal
courts refuse to rule and instead dismiss the case, leaving the constitu-
tional question to be resolved in the political process."
7
The most famous defense of the political question doctrine w-as
made by the late Professor Alexander Bickel.78 Professor Bickel
wrote,
Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinct, of the politi-
cal-question doctrine: the Court's sense of lack of capacity, com-
pounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and its
intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness
of it, which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety,
not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that per-
haps it should but will not be; (d) finally ("in a mature democracy"),
the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is
electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.
79
Although Bickel wrote these words almost four decades ago, they
seem almost prescient when applied to Bush v. Gore. Certainly in
terms of (a), there is "strangeness of the issue" and its intractability to
a principled resolution. Never before in history had the Supreme
Court decided a presidential election. The Court said that counting
the ballots without uniform standards would be unequal,80 but no
77 ERNawN CHEhmRINsEY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 143-44 (3d ed. 1999).
78 See, e.g., AL xAN.R M. BIcE.L, THE LAsr DANGERous B %Ncni: TI-E SUPrPEIE
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 184 (1962); Alexander M. Bickel, The Suprle Court,
1960 Term Foreword The Passive Virtues, 75 HaRV. L REv. 40, 46 (1961).
79 Bic i.L, supra note 78, at 184.
80 See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 527, 530-31 (2000).
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prior decision ever had found that variations among counties in elec-
tion practices was unconstitutional. Nor did the Court explain why
this inequality was impermissible while many other inequalities in
Florida, such as differences in voting machines, in ballots, and in
treatment of minority voters, were constitutional.
Indeed, the Court seemed aware of the problems with applying
equal protection to such variances among counties and with opening
the door to challenges to virtually every election because of reliance
on local election officials. The per curiam opinion said, "Our consid-
eration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many com-
plexities." ' This certainly confirms Professor Bickel's concerns about
the strangeness of the issue and the lack of principles for resolution of
it.
Professor Bickel's second factor is even more relevant: "the sheer
momentousness of [the issue], which tends to unbalance judicial judg-
ment." If any case fits this description, it surely is Bush v. Gore.
Professor Bickel's latter two criteria point to concern over what
issues should be decided by unelected judges. Bickel's concern was
how involvement in some political issues could compromise the legiti-
macy of the Court. Although I am critical of Bickel's view and of
many of the uses of the political question doctrine,s2 Bush v. Gare obvi-
ously cost the Supreme Court enormously in terms of its credibility.
Over forty-nine million people voted for Al Gore, and undoubtedly
virtually all of them regard the Court's decision as a partisan ruling by
a Republican majority in favor of the Republican candidate. Few
cases, if any, in American history have been more widely perceived as
partisan than Bush v. Gore.
Bickel's criteria, of course, are not legal rules. The classic state-
ment of the political question doctrine was provided in Baker v. Carr"
The Court stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unu-
sual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
81 Id. at 532.
82 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUrION 104-05 (1987).
83 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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ready made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
8 4
Many of the Baker v. Carr criteria were met. There is a "textual
commitment" of determining the electoral votes in a state to Con-
gress. Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution describes the process
for Congress to count the votes.85 After the entire process was done in
Florida, there might well have been competing claims as to which slate
of the electors should be counted as representing the state. Congress
had full authority, and the responsibility, to decide this issue.
There also was a clear lack ofjudicially discoverable and manage-
able standards. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court %%-as
what inequalities among counties in the voting process deny equal
protection. Many inequalities existed in Florida. Each county de-
signed its own ballot, and errors in Palm Beach County almost cer-
tainly caused over 3000 votes for Buchanan in error that were
intended for Gore.86 The Court itself expressed concern with count-
ing the "undervotes," ballots not counted by the machine, but not ex-
amining the "overvotes," ballots disqualified for appearing to have
chosen more than one candidate.87 Differences in the voting technol-
ogy used also caused inequalities. The most frequent type of voting
machine used in Florida was an optical scanner, which rejects, on av-
erage, four of every 1000 ballots cast.88 The next most common ma-
chine was the punch card system, which rejects, on average, fifteen of
every 1000 ballots.8 9
Why is this variance not a denial of equal protection, especially if
the differences pointed to by the Supreme Court are sufficient to vio-
late the Constitution? The Supreme Court, of course, provides no an-
swer to this question and no answer seems possible. If variances
among counties in a state in holding an election and counting ballots
denies equal protection, then the entire election in Florida was un-
constitutional and likely the elections in every state.
This, in itself, strongly indicates that the matter was a political
question left for Congress to resolve in deciding which slate of elec-
tors were to represent Florida in the electoral college. There are no
84 Id. at 217.
85 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
86 Dan Balz, Resolution Days Away as Bush's Lead Shrinks in Fla.; Gore Mulls Chat-
lenges, WASH. PosT, Nov. 10, 2000, at Al, A26. I should disclose that I was co-counsel
in this case and argued in the Florida trial court for a new election to remedy the
constitutional violations caused by the so-called "butterfly ballot."
87 See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 527, 531 (2000).
88 See Brief of Respondent at 43 n.24, Bush (No. 00-949).
89 See id.
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judicial standards for which differences among counties are unconsti-
tutional and which are permissible.
The response to this is that Baker v. Carr found that equal protec-
tion challenges to malapportionment were justiciable and not political
questions.90 The argument could be made that Bush v. Gore was justi-
ciable because it, too, was an equal protection claim. But Baker did
not hold that all equal protection challenges to election systems are
justiciable; it only held that malapportionment challenges were
justiciable.91
In other contexts the Court has found that equal protection chal-
lenges to the political process were non-justiciable. In O'Brien v.
Brown,92 the federal courts were asked to decide what group of dele-
gates should be seated at the 1972 Democratic National Convention.'-
The case reached the Supreme Court three days before the conven-
tion began.94 Illinois delegates, led by Mayor Richard Daley, were ex-
cluded on the ground that they were not sufficiently representative of
racial minorities.95 The Daley delegates argued that they were dis-
criminated against and denied equal protection.96 Also, a group of
California delegates pledged to Hubert Humphrey argued that the
State's winner-take-all primary was unconstitutional. 97 The court of
appeals ruled that the case was not a political question and on the
merits held for the California plaintiffs and against the Illinois plain-
tiffs.9s The Supreme Court stayed the court of appeals decision. The
Court stated,
In light of the availability of the convention as a forum to re-
view the recommendations of the Credentials Committee, in which
process the complaining parties might obtain the relief they have
sought from the federal courts, the lack of precedent to support the
extraordinary relief granted by the Court of Appeals, and the large
public interest in allowing the political processes to function free
from judicial supervision, we conclude the judgments of the Court
of Appeals must be stayed.99
90 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 236-37 (1960).
91 See id.
92 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
93 See id. at 2.
94 See id. at 3.
95 See id. at 7-8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 See id.
97 See id. at 2.
98 See id.
99 Id. at 5.
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There obviously is a difference in the factual setting of O'Brien v.
Brown as compared to Bush v. Gore Yet, there also are great similari-
ties. Both involved equal protection challenges to aspects of the polit-
ical process. Both involved a dispute between two slates claiming
legitimacy; the competing slates of delegates in O'Brien and, assuming
Gore came out ahead after the recount, the competing slates of elec-
tors in Bush. Both were situations where another forum existed to
resolve the dispute; the Convention in O'Brien and the Congress in
Bush could decide which slate to seat.
More importantly, the Court in O'BrTien spoke of "the lack of pre-
cedent to support the extraordinary relief."100 There obviously was no
precedent to support the extraordinary ruling by the United States
Supreme Court deciding the 2000 presidential election. Further-
more, in O'Brien, the Court spoke of "the large public interest in al-
lowing the political processes to function free from judicial
supervision." 0 1 This is exactly why Bush v. Gore should have been dis-
missed as a political question.
IV. WHO DECID.ES FLORIDA L.kw?
The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion made two arguments.
First, counting the uncounted votes without standards iolates equal
protection.' 0 2 Second, Forida law prevents the counting from contin-
uing past December 12.103 This second point is indispensable to the
Court's decision to end the counting. Assuming that there were ine-
qualities in the counting that violated the Constitution, there were two
ways to remedy this: count none of the uncounted badlots or count all
of the ballots with uniform standards. The latter would involve re-
manding the case to the Florida Supreme Court for development of
standards and for such relief as that court deemed appropriate.
It must be emphasized that the Supreme Court did not hold that
federal law prevented the counting from continuing. The only reason
for not remanding the case-as Justices Souter and Breyer argued
for' 0 4 -was the Court's judgment that Florida law prevented this. In
two paragraphs near the end of the per curiam opinion, the Court
explained why it stopped the counting.
The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature in-
tended the State's electors to "participat[e] fully in the federal elec-
106 nI.
101 Id.
102 See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 529-30 (2000).
103 See i. at 533.
104 See id. at 542-46, 550-58.
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toral process," as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5. That statute, in turn,
requires that any controversy or contest that is designed to lead to a
conclusive selection of electors be completed by December 12.
That date is upon us, and there is no recount procedure in place
under the State Supreme Court's order that comports with minimal
constitutional standards. Because it is evident that any recount
seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconstitutional for
the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Florida ordering a recount to proceed.
Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court
that demand a remedy. The only disagreement is as to the remedy.
Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida legisla-
ture intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5,Jus-
tice BREYER's proposed remedy-remanding to the Florida
Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitutionally proper contest
under December 18-contemplates action in violation of the Flor-
ida election code, and hence could not be part of an "appropriate"
remedy authorized by Fla. Stat. § 102.168(8) (2000).105
This is recited at length to show that the sole reason the Court
gave for ending the counting was based on its interpretation of Flor-
ida law. However, no Florida statute stated or implied that the count-
ing had to be done by December 12. The sole authority for the
Supreme Court's conclusion was one statement by the Florida Su-
preme Court.
0 6
However, that statement was made in a very different context and
when the Florida Supreme Court was not faced with the issue posed
by the Supreme Court's ruling. After the Supreme Court decided on
December 12 that the counting without standards violated equal pro-
tection, the issue was what remedy was appropriate under Florida law:
continue the counting past December 12 or end the counting to meet
the December 12 deadline. The Supreme Court could not possibly
know how the Florida Supreme Court would resolve this issue, be-
cause it never had occurred before. Prior Florida decisions empha-
sized the importance of making sure that every vote is accurately
105 Id. at 533 (citations omitted).
106 See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1286 n.17
(Fla. 2000) ("What is a reasonable time required for completion will, in part, depend
on whether the election is for a statewide office, for a federal office, or for presiden-
tial elections. In the case of the presidential election, the determination of reasona-
bleness must be circumscribed by the provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5, which sets December
12, 2000, as the date for final determination of any state's dispute concerning its elec-
tions in order for that determination to be given conclusive effect in Congress.").
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counted.10 7 The Florida Supreme Court might have relied on this to
continue the counting past December 12. Alternatively, the Florida
Supreme Court might have ended the counting, treating December
12 as a firm deadline in Florida.
The point is that this was a question of Florida law to be decided
by the Florida Supreme Court. It, of course, is clearly established that
state supreme courts get the final word as to the interpretation of state
law. In Murdock v. City of Memphis,l08 in 1875, the Supreme Court held
that it could review only questions of federal law and that the deci-
sions of the state's highest court are final on questions of state law.'09
The Court explained that section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 178911
was based on a belief that the Supreme Court must be available to
ensure state compliance with the United States Constitution, but that
there ias no indication that Congress intended the Court to oversee
state court decisions as to state law matters."'
From a federalism perspective, it is inexplicable why the five Jus-
tices in the majority-usually the advocates of states' rights on the
Court-did not remand the case to the Florida Supreme Court to de-
cide under Florida law whether the counting should continue. The
Supreme Court impermissibly usurped the Florida Supreme Court's
authority to decide Florida law in this extraordinary case.
How does this relate tojusticiability? Of course, even if it wvas not
enough to make the case nonjusticiable, it was a key flaw in the
Court's decision. But I believe it also shows additional justiciability
problems in Bush v. Gore- The Supreme Court's holding wvas to stop
the counting, but this was premature until the Florida Supreme Court
decided the unresolved issue of Florida law, whether to let the count-
ing continue past December 12.
Moreover, an analogy can be drawn to the political question doc-
trine. This justiciability doctrine is based on the premise that some
issues are best left to others. The interpretation of Florida law was for
the Florida Supreme Court to resolve and that determination should
have been final in the Supreme Court. In Baker v. Can, the Court
spoke of a political question based on "the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
107 See, e.g., In re Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots in November 4.
1997 Election for the City of Miami, 707 So. 2d 1170, 1174 (1998).
108 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
109 See id. at 635-36.
110 Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
IIl See Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 634-36.
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respect due coordinate branches of government."112 Yet, the Court's
deciding rather than remanding in Bush v. Gore did exactly this.
CONCLUSION
Bush v. Gore is, by many measures, one of the most important
Supreme Court decisions in history. For the first time, the Supreme
Court determined who would be the President of the United States.
The irony, of course, is that the five Justices in the majority are those
who most profess a need for judicial restraint, most seek to protect
states' rights, and most have championed restrictive justiciability doc-
trines. In Bush v. Gore, these five Justices abandoned all of these
principles.
Not surprisingly, a large segment of the American public-espe-
cially the forty-nine million people who voted for Gore-see the deci-
sion as a purely partisan ruling. Justice Stevens concluded his
dissenting opinion by stating:
[The] position [of] the majority of this Court can only lend
credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges
throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and women who
administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule
of law. Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that
will be inflicted by today's decision. One thing, however, is certain.
Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of
the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the
loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as
an impartial guardian of the rule of law.113
112 369 U.S. 186, 217.
113 Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 542 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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